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IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain ti ff/ Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL DUBRAE WALDOCH, 
Defendant/ A ellant. 
I. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED 
Criminal No. 111600055 
Appellate Case No. 20140851-CA 
Trial Judge: MARVIN D. BAGLEY 
JURISDICTION 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that jurisdiction is appropriate before the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42 (a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the case 
having been transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-4-103(2)(j) (1953, as amended). 
II. 
RESOLUTION OF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellee sets forth what it believes to be the facts recited in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict consistent with State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d, 1201, 1205-06 
(Utah, 1993). This amounts to simply picking out those portions of the transcript that 
Appellee believes to be sufficient to support the convictions but making no attempt to 
reconcile the non-conforming evidence and testimony presented at trial, identified in 
Appellant's brief, the evidence which is inconsistent or contrary to the assertions made by 
the victim. 
This amounts to stating that the victim's testimony was sufficient and generally 
purporting that her assertion of non-consensual contact is corroborated by the fact that 
she had bruising on her ribcage and on both thighs, vaginal abrasions and that DNA 
testing found seminal fluid on her sweater. 
The Appellee does not attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies in the physical 
evidence regarding DNA testing, the issue of abrasion verses laceration, as it pertains to 
consensual v. non-consensual contact or the testimony of at least one expert witness. In 
short, the Appellant makes no effort to recognize the physical evidence inconsistent with 
the victim's assertion of non-consensual contact, choosing to simply ignore it. The 
Appellant takes the position that this is not a case of his word against her word. Rather, 
one where the physical evidence supports Appellant's version of the facts and does not 
support the assertions made by the victim that such contact was non-consensual. The case 
is further complicated by the fact that other events occurred at the trial which 
compromised the jury deliberation process and impacted its outcome. This included 
having a husband and wife serve in the same jury, not making full and complete 
admonition regarding any discussion of the case prior to deliberation, the prosecutor 
appealing to the jury's passions and prejudices, attempting to invoke sympathy for the 
victim rather than address the factual findings made by the State's witnesses; getting the 
jury to relive the victim's experience instead of addressing the inconsistencies and 
medical testimony, and deliberation was also compromised by Appellant receiving 
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ineffective assistance of counsel by counsel not objecting to what had transpired. 
III. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS 
POINTNO.1 
THE APPELLANT'S GENERAL ASSERTION OF SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE MISSES THE DISTINSTION RASIED AT TRIAL EVIDENCING 
CONSENSUAL OVER NON-CONSENSUAL CONTACT 
The primary distinction in the evidence which appears to be missed by Appellee is 
the evidence on injuries which is not consistent with non-consensual contact. Rather, the 
injuries sustained confinn consensual contact and are inconsistent with the victim's 
testimony. This case is unique in that it shows how physical evidence must be reconciled 
to eliminate reasonable doubt. 
Notwithstanding the Appellee's assertion, the testimony at the trial showed that 
the physical evidence did not support the victim's assertion of penetration and where the 
conduct occurred while she was sitting upright in a vehicle, penetration would not have 
been possible without her making accommodation by repositioning her lower body to 
allow for it. Non-consensual contact would have left laceration not abrasion. Laceration 
is the injury that would have corroborated the victim's testimony. Abrasion does not. 
Abrasion is not inconsistent with consensual contact and the evidence presented at trial 
does not exclude the possibility that this was the result of contact over clothing or caused 
by the clothing itself. In other words, the physical evidence is not as suggested by 
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Ill 
Appellee consistent with the victim's testimony and does not corroborate her testimony. 
Still, it is the evidence presented at trial is what it is and this constitutes the basis upon 
which the jury's convictions are to be sustained. It would be inappropriate for a jury to 
simply ignore the inconsistent physical evidence just as it should be inappropriate for this 
Court to ignore such to sustain a conviction based only upon the testimony of the victim 
with such inconsistent physical evidence. The evidence in this case presents a 
circumstance consistent with State v Maestas, 2012 UT, 46, 299 P. 3d 892, that it is 
sufficient to disturb a jury verdict where it is physically impossible or obviously false. 
The physical evidence here reveals circumstances upon which the victim asserts non-
consensual penetration, physically impossible and/or obviously false without her 
accommodating such penetration by repositioning herself while sitting upright in her 
vehicle. Moreover, the testimony of the victim is not precise. There is no clear evidence 
of penetration. Rather, the evidence of penetration is cobbled together by the victim's 
imprecise assertion with regard to penetration where conclusions are drawn from medical 
personnel based upon abrasion, an injury consistent with consensual contact. This does 
not make the evidence sufficient to confirm the conviction of object rape but points out 
clearly the insufficiency of it. 
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POINT NO. 2 
APPELLANT HAS SHOWN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE 
BRIEFING IS SUFFICIENT AND COMPLETE. 
Appellee attempts to assert that Appellant has not met its burden under Rule 24, 
Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, by failing to cite to authority or offering reasoned 
analysis on that authority. The reply is a simple one. There is no such authority in the 
State of Utah because this is a matter of first impression. Appellant has addressed the 
issues of concern which even the case law cited by Appellee support. In short, when 
circumstances arise where a husband and wife are serving on the same jury, the trial court 
should have been prompted to make further inquiry into each juror's ability to render an 
independent decision or to dismiss one of the two as having a relationship too close as to 
imply a bias or undue influence depriving the Appellant of his right to have the matter 
tried before an impartial and fair jury. The circumstances were discussed in detail and 
presented in the context or Rule 17 (k), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals 
with making appropriate and complete admonition and in the present case this was never 
done. Appellee cites to Childs v State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48 ( 1987) in support of 
its assertion that the great weight of case law from other jurisdictions shows that having 
spouses on juries does not constitute error; however, in that case, spouses serving on 
juries was never discussed let alone addressed in the context suggested by Appellee. In 
State v Richie, 960 P.2d 1227, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed the matter but 
considered allowing such to occur only upon the assurance that further voir dire inquiry 
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was made. In pertinent part, it stated: 
We disagree with Richie's assertion that jurors that are married to each other must 
be disqualified from jury service. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson expressly stated 
during voir dire that they would each make their own decisions and would not 
automatically go along with the other person. Thus, there is no evidence that Mr. 
and Mrs. Ferguson was incapable of fulfilling his or her responsibilities as a juror. 
Richie cannot demonstrate actual impairment of the Fergusons' ability to serve as 
jurors. Id at 1244. 
The court in that case went on to suggest that there was an implied bias where a G 
perspective juror is a prosecutor employed at the same office as the prosecutor trying the 
defendant but found that to be a disguising characteristic in the case before it. In the 
present case, this part of the admonition was never sufficiently given particularly in light 
of the fact that two of the juror would be returning home to the same household. 
In Harris v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 40, the Supreme Court of Kentucky 
followed a procedure that should have been followed in the present case. In that case, the 
Court stated as follows: 
Following individual voir dire and prior to commencement of general voir dire, 
Harris noted that the remaining panel included two married couples, jurors' 28 and 
29, and another couple. Arguing that these jurors would not be independent but 
would unduly influence each other and also they would find it difficult not to 
discuss the case as it was proceeding, Harris moved to have one member of each 
couple randomly selected and dismissed. The trial court denied the motion at that 
point in time, ruling instead that the couples could be questioned and if their 
answers confirmed Harris' concerns one member of the couples could then be 
removed. During general voir dire Harris referred to these couples and asked them 
whether they would not find it difficult to refrain from discussing the case as it 
was going on. Both couples gave assurance, however, that they would be able to 
abide by the admonition not to discuss the case. Harris did not ask these couples 
whether they would be apt to influence each other, and he did not renew his 
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objection at the end of the voir dire and did not remove either juror 28 or 29 
peremptorily. Both served on the jury. Id at 49 
When the Appellant in that case challenged the married jurors status, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Indeed, we have held that notwithstanding a perspective jurors responses during 
voir dire, whatever his or her protestation of lack of bias, the jurors close 
relationship, (be it familial, financial or situational, with any of the parties, 
counsel, victims or witnesses) is sufficient to require the court (to sustain the 
challenge for cause and excuse the juror). (Citation omitted). This is so, we 
explained, because however sincere and well-meaning such prospective jurors 
may be, such close personal relationships are apt to unconsciously affect their 
decision in the case. (Citation omitted). Bias, however, presumptive or otherwise 
refers generally to jurors favoring or disfavoring one side of the case or the other, 
a risk not posed by relationships between jurors. For that reason, the few courts 
that have addressed the issue of married jurors have held that such jurors are not 
presumptively disqualified and that their independence may be adequately assured 
through voir dire. Id at 50. 
Again, this is what did not occur in the present case. In other words, the great 
weight of authority cited by Appellee supports the proposition that having married jurors 
serve on the same jury prompts a more detailed voir dire questioning and admonition 
which did not occur. This case is the consequence of inadequate inquiry by the trial court 
or defense counsel's failure to object and it was error on the part of the court or 
ineffective assistance of counsel and in either case the matter warrants remand. 
Ill 
Ill 
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POINT NO. 3 
THE CIRCUMSTANCE INVOLVING A HUSBAND AND WIFE SERVING ON THE 
SAME JURY IS AN EXCEPTIONAL ONE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER 
THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE. 
Appellee treats the circumstance involving married jurors the same as something 
one might see in the normal course of jury selection or deliberation. The event is so rare 
that there is no previous Utah authority on the matter that attempts to address the issue. 
Since Mrs. Rasmussen only served as an alternate and did not participate in the 
deliberation process, the Appellee contends that it is not really an issue. This position 
misses the point entirely. The issue is one of influence upon those who did serve on the 
jury and to that extent the influence does not simply go away by having the alternate 
dismissed. In fact, the entire voir dire process becomes unreliable when it comes to 
relationships that are so closely connected. To assume that such influence would not be 
present or not have an impact simply because each married member of the jury responded 
appropriately to voir dire questions seems to cast a blind eye upon the process for which 
the very purpose is to preserve a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. It makes a GJ 
mockery of the entire voir dire process. This is exactly the kind of undue influence that 
cannot be cured through voir dire on rehabilitated by asking additional questions. 
Appellee argues that Appellant failed in establishing that such a circumstance is a rare 
one simply because Appellant has failed to cite to authority calling it such. The 
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circumstances of this case are even more rare because there is no such authority 
addressing this situation in that context. 
POINT NO. 4 
THIS CASE WARRANTS A ST AND ARD OF PRESUMED PREJUDICE 
To hold Appellant to establish actual prejudice verses a presumed standard creates 
an impossible burden. The Appellant argues that when it concerns the impact of one juror 
upon another this can never be established when such inquiries are barred through the 
deliberation process under Rule 606, the Utah Rules of Evidence. The only way such 
information would come to light after deliberation would be through the testimony of 
another member of the jury and this would be disqualified to the extent that is was not 
presented extraneously or manifested as an outside influence improperly utilized by the 
jury. This is exactly why the influence of a spouse is one that should give rise to 
suspicion because it would not necessarily manifest itself in such outward expression. 
Rather, it is the type of influence and impact that would not necessarily be declared or 
conveyed through the deliberation process but would have its influence upon 
deliberation. While Appellee cites to various sources in conjunction with a standard of 
actual prejudice, the circumstance before the Court is unique and not one upon which the 
failure to admonish concerned a jury of this composition. Therefore, the cases cited do 
not reflect the heightened sensitivity upon the issue as to why such failure to admonish 
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Ill 
should be presumed prejudicial. 
The same argument applies with regard to a show of actual bias. Again as 
explained above, the circumstances go beyond merely a juror responding appropriately to 
questions being asked but due to the relationship require a deeper inquiry to ensure that 
the Appellant receives a fair and impartial jury at trial. However, the circumstances of the 
present case are void of any such inquiry entirely and this was due to the fact that such 
inquiry was never made either by the Court or by defense counsel. 
POINT NO. 5 
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The Appellee finds no inconsistency in arguing that issues on appeal have not 
been preserved and failed to qualify under the Plain Error Doctrine and at the same time 
argue that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellee attempts to argue that 
the fact that defense counsel did not object or make more adequate inquiry into jury 
selection was somehow a calculated trial strategy which is not manifested in the record. 
There is no sound trial strategy which would have condoned keeping a husband and wife 
on a jury involving a criminal case of sexual abuse and object rape. In short, the 
performance of defense counsel was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by 
suffering a conviction, see Strictland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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POINT NO. 6 
APPELLANT HAS ADEOUATEL Y ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT AS IT PERTAINS TO APPEALING TO JUROR'S PASSIONS 
AND PREJUDICES CONCERNING THE VICTIM. 
This was a case that came down to an issue of evidence regarding consensual 
verses non consensual contact. One where the victim's testimony was called into question 
and the issues before the trial court concerned those as to whether or not the medical 
testimony corroborated her assertion. The fact is that the physical evidence did not 
corroborate the testimony of the victim and as a result the prosecutor enticed the jury to 
follow a course to get its members to relive the event from the victim's perspective and 
made an appeal vouching for her truthfulness and how she might feel if they ruled against 
her. Having the prosecutor vouch for the truthfulness of the victim is not appropriate in 
closing argument. Addressing the matter in the context in having jurors relive the 
victim's experience appealing to their sympathies for the victim is also not appropriate. 
The impact that it had upon the jury is a matter that cannot be preserved due to the Rules 
of Evidence that have been heretofore addressed. Counsel for the defense was ineffective 
in failing to make a proper objection notwithstanding the fact that the parties approached 
the bench during the prosecutor's closing argument which seemed to have diverted at 
least in part the direction which the prosecutor was intending to argue. It is, however, in 
11 
light of all these factors that the matter should be considered as a whole. In particular the 
evidence in not precise nor sufficient to establish the key element of penetration for 
purposes of the rape charge and this has been compromised by the unusual makeup of the 
jury in light of the status of two of its members, as well as, ineffective representation at 
trial, incomplete and infrequent admonition and prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument. When viewing the matter in its entirety, there can be no doubt that the 
Appellant in this case failed to receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury. In fact, it is the 
obvious nature of these particular characteristics that make this case a particularly 
egregious one since the process itself is one focused on addressing such concerns with 
particularity to ensure that a situation such as this one does not arise and in fact it is a 
situation that has not manifested itself in the State of Utah at least to the extent of this 
Court has addressed such concerns in the past. In light of these circumstances, the 
Appellant asserts that the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant prays 
that this Court reverse or remand as it deems appropriate together with such other and 
further relief as to it appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this /✓zr.y of-¥, 20 ;,,-:r-
J. BR-ei'JACKSON 
Counsel for Appellant 
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